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Powerlessnes vs. Empowerment:
Aporia of Human Rights and Political SubjectivationFRANZISKA MARTINSENLeibniz Universität Hannover, Germany
IntroductionWithin the critical discourse of postcolonialism on human rights, there is an argumentshared by a number of theorists, according to which human rights cannot not be wanted(cf. Kapur 2006: 682). An ambivalence of simultaneous attraction and repulsion, it issaid, is inherent in human rights. Their origins in the European tradition of natural law,the corresponding Eurocentric and hegemonic bias of their conceptual foundations inthe form of an abstract individual and a moral universalism, as well as the liberalisticdominance of the notion of property make them appear suspect to postcolonialisttheorists. At the same time, human rights, not least with a historical view on the FrenchRevolution, contain a profoundly emancipatory core. In their joint text Qu’est-ce que la
philosophie?, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari share the postcolonialist skepticism of thepresent conception of human rights (cf. 1991). In their opinion, human rights are acentral part of the capitalist system, rather than actually questioning its domination. Allthe more problematic, they argue, is the fact that human rights elude any questioning:“Human rights are axioms. They can exist on the market with many other axioms,notably those concerning the security of property, which are unaware of or suspendthem even more than they contradict them” (1991: 107). In my essay, I want to reflecton and somewhat weaken precisely this (pre-)judgment on human rights, by disclosingwithin them exactly that potential for resistance that Deleuze and Guattari find sopainfully lacking in the present epoch of capitalism when they write: “We lack creation.
We lack resistance to the present” (1991: 108). It must be shown that genuine resistanceto present-day human rights can be developed from the very idea of human rights itself.The prerequisite for this, however, is a certain modification of the currentunderstanding of human rights, which has to be carried out both discursively and inpractice within the framework of political processes of subjectivation (cf. Rancière 1995;Martinsen 2017: ch. 6): human rights must be conceived as political rights rather thanmoral universal truths (cf. e.g. Peter 2013; Kreide 2015).
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My article is divided into three parts: after the introduction, I explain in the secondsection the powerlessness of human rights, or the powerlessness of the ‘universalholders of human rights’. In the third part, based on the critique of the presentconception of human rights, I take a look at their aspirative surplus from which, in myview, an empowering potential can arise.Regarding the question of powerlessness versus empowerment, the ambivalentattitude towards human rights, as they present themselves to us in the now almost 70-year-old conception of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948, henceforthUDHR), results from the – also historically – triply ambivalent character of human rights.1) The first ambivalence consists equally in in its promise and its failure: on the onehand, the human rights demand for freedom and equality embodies a tremendousexplosive power both in a political and social context; on the other hand, it remainsmerely rhetorical at precisely those points where it appears to promise inclusion andparticipation. According to Hannah Arendt, human rights have a tautological or emptymeaning, especially in political terms. Under the present legal conditions, human rightsare either the rights of citizens or they are the rights of people who are de facto, i.e.politically, without rights (cf. 1968: 300; Rancière 2004: 297f; Zhang 2014: 245).2) With this, we come to the second ambivalence of universality and historicity.While the aspiration of human rights is to be, if not universally valid, then at leastuniversalizable (cf. Pollmann 2009), it is clear from the context of their origins inEuropean modern natural law that both their formal-conceptual form as well as theircontent – Marx has famously pointed this out in his text “On the Jewish Question” – aresubject to historical conditions and ideas (cf. 1961). Detached from real existing politicalcircumstances, the whole of humanity may indeed be claimed as the holder of humanrights; nevertheless, national powers such as nation-state sovereignty remain de jureand de facto largely unaffected. The politico-legal guarantee of human rights isdependent on the status of citizenship. Thus, the universality of the validity of humanrights already ends at national boundaries.3) At this point, the third ambivalence of affirmation and critique is touched upon.The support for human rights is self-evident for most of the theorists of the global North;at most, there is a controversy about details relating to justification. The situation isdifferent for postcolonialist authors who denounce the blind spots and distortions of thecurrent human rights discourse and its narrative of civilization or progress, even if theydo not necessarily want to abandon the idea of human rights as a whole.The three ambivalences are connected with the conceptual tension between theabstract-general and moral character of human rights on the one hand and, on the other,the fact that they attain political validity almost exclusively in the form of concrete civil
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rights guaranteed by the nation-state in the first place. Based on this premise, theexclusion of non-citizens from the ambit of human rights is, among other things,unavoidable. And it is precisely the exclusion of non-citizens from the realm of politicalparticipation that has to be considered problematic with regard to the question ofpowerlessness versus empowerment.
PowerlessnessModern human rights thinking imagines human rights as the rights of the abstractindividual. There is a paradox inherent in the concept of the abstract individual, theexplanation of which – drawing on Hannah Arendt’s critique of human rights –illuminates the connection between human rights and powerlessness. Arendt objects tothe concept of the “‘abstract’ human being who seemed to exist nowhere” (1968: 291),which, according to the tradition of natural law, conceives the human being as detachedfrom his/her historical determinants. The idea of an individual freed from belonging,status, and origin is first to be understood as an Archimedean point, from which thefeudal system of the estates of the realm was to be unhinged. Accordingly, the originallyemancipatory idea of human rights is to put them forward as claims of individualsagainst the state – with a view to avoiding despotism, the state is obliged to safeguardand protect rights which are seen as innate and thus inalienable. These pre-state rightsare, in short, increasingly understood as moral rights – not least because it is only in thisway that they can be regarded as a standard that is universally valid and independent ofrealpolitik, making possible a critical and, if necessary, corrective assessment of stateaction. Particularly with regard to the latter function, this distinction from positivizednational constitutional or civil rights is logically even necessary. Nonetheless, especiallythe French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789) already recognizedthe need for a legal enshrining of these pre-state rights and therefore linked them withthe nationally connoted idea of popular sovereignty. With the principle of the nation,however, there arises a conceptual problem requiring the reconciliation of the declareduniversality of human rights on the one hand with that very limitation of their validity toa certain number of persons on the other. According to Arendt, there is thus acontradiction between the abstract man and the characteristic of the plurality of humanexistence, a contradiction which the current concept of human rights cannot adequatelygrasp. A similar thought can be found in Deleuze and Guattari: “Human rights saynothing about the immanent modes of existence of people provided with rights” (1991:107).Above all, Arendt criticizes that, despite a wide range of implementations, humanrights still remain essentially non-political rights. To be sure, human rights are – inabstract terms – attributed to every human being in the world as inalienable and
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indispensable. However, outside the sphere of influence of a political community orbeyond international treaties and some areas of international law, they are not capableof guaranteeing an actual legal right. In other words: human rights do not acquire anypolitical significance as long as they are not already enshrined as civil or fundamentalrights in national constitutions anyway. This, as mentioned earlier, is the tautological orempty meaning of human rights.According to Arendt, the contradiction between the (liberal) conception of anabstract man and the social, political and cultural constitution of human existenceculminates in the fact that the status of having universal human rights is identical withthe status of rightlessness and, accordingly, with the status of being “thrown out” (1968:294). This claim becomes more understandable when we bear in mind that, for her,‘thrown out’ does not only mean a spatial outside of, e.g., the being-far-from, as it ischaracteristic of the flight, when a person is outside the territory of his homeland. Hercritique is rather directed at the fundamental outside of as it is the reality for manyimmigrants with regard to social and political participation, most sharply in the contextof internment, deportation or deprivation of citizenship. We can sum up with Arendt,Rancière and Agamben (cf. Arendt 1968: 294ff; Agamben 2001; Rancière 2004) that as arefugee/stateless person, man (sic) is merely man, he/she is the embodiment of theabstract individual par excellence, a human being divested of his/her politically andsocially defined identity. In spite of the existence of a human rights regime, theindividual is virtually in the state of nature. That this state of nature is not ametaphorical description, but the site of struggle for physical survival is illustrated in aparticularly extreme way by the practice of intercepting boat people at sea or ofrestricting those travelling on land in their mobility with barbed-wire fences, as well asthat of detaining or deporting those who have reached the mainland or destination. Thestate of nature of human rights is thus a decidedly precarious, indeed, a life-threateningstate.Arendt refers to the powerlessness and ineffectiveness of these ‘natural’, merelymoral rights with her famous formula of the ‘aporia of human rights’. Frantz Fanon, too,explains the powerlessness of human rights by reference to the liberal paradigm of theseparation of the moral and the political sphere, according to which the world is dividedinto a “zone of being” and a “zone of nonbeing” (1967: 10). While, in the zone of being,rights as guarantors provide for legality and protection, in the zone of nonbeing, theydefine a ‘victim’ status under which fall those affected by marginalization, exploitationand violence, without being granted the same subject position as the beneficiaries of thezone of being. The division of the spheres results from a problematic tendency towardsnon-state military professionalization (e.g. in the form of a one-sided shift tohumanitarian measures) and is linked with a tendency towards depoliticization and,finally, the distorting production of so-called ‘victims’ (cf. Odinkalu 1999): In the current
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International Human Rights regime, it is not the case that subjects generally anduniversally attribute human rights to themselves, but subjects, i.e., the so-called ‘holdersof human rights’ are only constituted by human rights in the first place – namely aspassive victims on the one hand, who are to be saved by heroic actors of an InternationalProtection System on the other. In the name of human rights, the specific colonialist-global socio-economic hierarchies, power structures and privileges are thus naturalizedand perpetuated (cf. Marks 2012: 317ff).The discriminatory, marginalizing and excluding mechanisms are still inscribed intothe notion of human rights universalism. Because holders of human rights, if they arenot lucky enough to possess a certain citizenship, remain in the state of nature, thismeans exclusion for a certain number of people – both within nation-states and world-wide. Patrick Hayden uses the term ‘global apartheid’ for this (cf. Hayden 2009: 80).Similarly, Étienne Balibar – here focusing on Europe – speaks of a ‘European apartheid’(“European citizenship-cum-apartheid”, (2004: 124) and points to the continuity ofcolonial practices contained in this. For Arendt, therefore, the fleeing and the statelessperson is the emblematic figure par excellence, whose status reveals the contradictionsbetween a citizenship focused on national belonging and the current conception ofhuman rights (cf. Krause 2008: 331).
EmpowermentAt this point, the dimension of human rights powerlessness, most evident in thediscourse of the aporia of human rights, shall be contrasted with the – not leasthistorically documented – differing dimension of the aspirative surplus of human rights.In the aspirative aspect of human rights, one can locate the possibility of self-empowering practice beyond a national framework based on territorial and parentageprinciples. Instead of a pre-determined attribution of the subject status (e.g. justified inthe context of natural law), as is typical of the contemporary human rights discourse, I,following Jacques Rancière, want to point to the potential of human rights semantics forpolitical subjectivation, i.e., for a process in which subjects actively constitutethemselves in the first place. Political subjectivation, according to Rancière,redefines the field of experience that gave to each their identity with their lot. Itdecomposes and recomposes the relationships between the ways of doing, ofbeing, and of saying that define the perceptible organization of the community, therelationships between the places where one does one thing and those where onedoes something else, the capacities associated with this particular doing and thoserequired for another. (1999: 40)
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Rancière means that political subjects are not to be viewed as already existing entities.Instead, they constitute themselves, e.g. in the course of the demand for certain rights aspolitical subjects (cf. 2004). In the process of the formation as subjects, however, theactors, as Rancière emphatically points out, generate a political space, the result ofwhich is initially open. The activities of subjectivation can lead to the creation of a newpolitical order (in Rancière’s terminology, a new ‘police’ order). However, they can also,for the time being, focus on resistance and the questioning of the existing order.Now, human rights are able to play a significant role in processes of subjectivationinsofar as, on the one hand, they constitute reference points for individual political andsocial struggles for political equality and the attainment of rights, and, on the other, theyare closely linked to diverse notions of a (also global) democratic order beyond existingpolice orders. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the affirmative reference tohuman rights as a guiding principle for strategies of empowerment must not beidentified with a consent to the already existing version of the conception of humanrights, as it exists in the form of the UDHR 1948. On the contrary, approaches havingrecourse to human rights are well aware of the fact that human rights as rights inrealpolitik constitute a facet of the practices of governmentality aimed at thestabilization of domination and the extension of control. The fear that aninternationalization of the legal system primarily perpetuates or even exacerbates theinequality between the global North and South (cf. Saar 2006: 812ff), i.e., the globaleconomic relations of precarity, so that political mechanisms of exclusion are cementedrather than dismantled, remains in place.If, however, in the consideration of processes of subjectivation, the emphasis isplaced more strongly on the aspect of critique and the questioning of existingunderstandings of human rights and on the aspect of resistance to prevailing patterns oforder, then there is the chance of examining the prerequisites for the formation of anormative counter-order: Through a perpetual verbal attacking of the existing order, therepeated transgression of – conceptual and territorial – boundaries, as well as thegathering and pooling of experiences of resistance, actors can constitute themselves as acollective political subject, which does not necessarily have to merge into ahomogeneous unity, but preserves its diversity. Concerning both, the naming andidentification of experiences of injustice as well as the aspirative ideas of a humaneworld – especially postcolonialist theorists point this out – the vocabulary of humanrights is helpful. After all, they name exactly that which should be equally andinalienably given to humans as humans. It is then up to the concrete political disputes todetermine discursively the precise content of human rights claims. In this discourse,particular importance is attached to the right to political participation, with the help ofwhich, according to Rancière, the interval between having-human-rights and not-having-human-rights could be overcome.
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In this context, human rights are the synonym for the unquenchable and self-legitimizing “desire for universal rights” (Hoover 2013: 935). This, however, is not aboutthe indifferent universalism of the European Enlightenment. Instead, a pluralistic,resistant universalism must be developed. Here, e.g., postcolonialist approaches whichinterpret human rights as an “insurrectionary praxis” (Baxi 2006: 22) are to be madefruitful. Following Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (cf. 2008), with the uncovering ofproblematic implications and the concomitant deconstruction of the distortingconnotations of the abstract individual as the holder of human rights, it could – despite awidespread skepticism towards the western-dominated human rights practice – bemade possible for the subaltern to see themselves as subjects of their own history and toempower themselves to political agency. Thus, instead of completely rejecting humanrights on the basis of their – indisputably – Eurocentric origin and their frequentfunctionalization for the purposes of power, the option is opened up to modify theconcept of human rights inventively in the Deleuzian sense. Then, the goal of ‘strugglesabout rights’ would not be a finished interpretation of human rights. Rather, in keepingwith Arendt’s demand for a fundamental right to rights, it would be about ‘theprimordial political right to take the right’ (“das politische Ur-Recht, sich das Recht zu
nehmen”, Raimondi 2011: 379). Certainly, this right would consist first and foremost inbringing forward new proposals for diverse interpretations of the right to have rightsand thus new impulses for its political implementation.One of the main criticisms of the critical human rights discourse (cf. Martinsen2017: ch. 4) concerns the lack of a right to political participation within the presentcatalog of human rights. Insofar as the right to access to political participation is madedependent on a particular nationality, it is, according to common legal practice, notgiven the same status in the human rights catalog as the right to freedom of expressionor assembly (cf. art. 20 UDHR 1948), let alone the right to life or freedom (cf. art. 3 UDHR1948), which is considered universally valid and attributed to every individualindependent of nationality. At this point, a corresponding criticism of human rightscomes into play, by turning the tables and discussing the option in how far a right topolitical participation (independent of citizenship) should even be counted as part of anineluctable core of human rights – such as the right to life – in order to meet thecriterion of empowerment.For a possible modification of the understanding of human rights, which morestrongly accommodates the political dimension, indeed, the political conditionality ofpluralistically constituted human life, what is thus needed above all is a critical reflectionof the ‘European’ origin of the legal subject, for which particularly postcolonial theorycan provide insights examining in more detail the reduction of human rights to pre-staterights. To this end, it is imperative to make the problematic inscriptions of the human
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rights concept of the subject clear – albeit with the knowledge that they cannot beeliminated without giving up important historical achievements.1) An alternative notion of human rights would therefore firstly have to attachparticular importance to the right to political participation, because the possibility foreach individual to have a share in the shaping of the conditions of one’s own and of thecollective life constitutes precisely that fundamental aspiration which deserves thename ‘human right’.2) Secondly, a critical theory of human rights should – drawing on socio-theoretically informed understandings of interpersonal communication structures andof the associated institutions – reflect on the relationship between individuals andpossible forms of the political community, and thus not regard collectives such aspolitical communities as something that precedes the individuals. This in turn meansthat the focus should be more on spaces of freedom to be opened up in and throughpolitical actions and on the resulting dynamics, processes and structures, and less on thedetails of the design of institutions concerning forms of sovereignty and government. If,in the following, a more convincing reading of the relationship between human rightsand political participation is the issue, then what is primarily of interest here is theempowerment potential for individuals which could result from a conceptual connectionof human rights and political participation. Jacques Rancière refers to this potential forpolitical subjectivation as a democratic process, whichimplies the action of subjects who, by working the interval between identities,reconfigure the distribution of the public and the private, the universal and theparticular. Democracy can never be identified with the simple domination of theuniversal over the particular. (2006: 61f)Democracy is here not identified as a mode of sovereignty or government, but as aspecific practice of participation in the course of which logics and meaning patterns ofexisting patterns of authority and government are disrupted and redefined – ifindividuals are willing to see themselves as actors and to open up a political space.Democracy is then not to be confused with a general mode of sovereignty which laysdown universal norms irrespective of the articulation of dissent.The modification of the understanding of human rights could then consist inrevitalizing the emancipatory potential of human rights. In this way, a reduction topurely humanitarian acts and a depoliticization of human rights activities could becountered. In the return to the empowering potential originally inherent in humanrights, a – to put it cautiously – ‘truly universal’ value could be discovered, which isshared by plural concepts of subjectivation. This form of universalism, however, wouldnot be an ‘instrument of a globalization from above’ (cf. Sousa Santos 1995). Rather,human rights, especially also in subaltern contexts, as demanded by postcolonial
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criticism, can be read as an appropriation of the political subject status, withoutnecessarily having to share the concept of an atomized, utility-maximizing individualinherent in the Eurocentric variant of human rights. In this open – and opening –reading, the originally progressively connoted event of the human rights declarations inthe late 18th century, which is emphatically evoked by so many, could actually take aform in which the Arendtian right to rights is understood to mean that the right topolitical subjectivation is owed to every individual.The notion of a sphere of political self-empowerment, which ideally consists notonly in a worldwide inclusive political negotiation process as regards the content ofhuman rights, but also in the active struggle for the right to political participation,consequently raises expectations concerning the development of a disputatious publicregarding the scandal of human rights exclusion, expectations that are directed neithersolely at official institutions, office holders and decision makers, nor at theorists, butsimply at all people.The outcome of this negotiation process is by no means certain. At the present time,it has not been decided which concrete conclusions are to be drawn from a human rightscritique such as the one made here – the spectrum of approaches ranges from ambitiousdeliberations on equal opportunities policies for refugees and stateless persons withinnation states, such as the Charter of Lampedusa (cf. Melting Pot Europa 2014), to theconception of a transnational citizenship (cf., among others, Cabrera 2010), and all theway to the idea of a global political sphere of a democracy ‘without demos’ (cf. Colliot-Thélène 2011). The step towards the establishment of a global order in which allhumans are equal world citizens would not be far at this point. The fact that theseapproaches, even if they appear to be desirable in normative terms, appear utopian orare at least regarded as unrealizable, causes much dismissal within the discourse.However, Alex Demirović (2008: 117) recalls that in the course of the historicaldevelopment, a lot has been included in the canon of human rights that corresponds tothe experiences and the social struggles of past centuries.As part of a critical human rights semantics, human rights could hence at least serveas a radical interrogation reservoir and thus assume a role that seems to have somewhatfallen into oblivion in the course of a sometimes over-affirmative human rights policy.Wendy Brown points out that the current human rights regime and its rhetoric must bereminded that the realization of human rights does not consist in the enlargement ofmarket-compliant freedom-of-choice options, but that they are threatened precisely bythis regime’s often undemocratic and hegemonically enforced interventionist remediesagainst so-called human ‘suffering’. Brown certainly does not deny that human sufferingis to be combated, yet she doubts whether prevention and alleviation of suffering areultimately “the most that can be hoped for” (2011: 145) just because the hopes for more
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than the alleviation of suffering, i.e., e.g., for inclusive participation and democraticequality, must be considered as utopian. At this point, however, Wendy Brown’spessimism reveals precisely its opposite, namely that the present conception of humanrights is precisely not the best that can be hoped for. Instead, the anthropological notionof human life contained in it should urgently be revised. In this context, theDeleuzoguattarian skepticism has already been pointed out, and indeed, one has toagree with them when they write that human rights do not say nothing about theconcrete modes of existence of human beings provided with rights” (cf. 1991: 107). It istherefore all the more important that people around the world make their diverse viewsof human life as well as their desire to have a political say in the conditions of life heard.This would already be a first step towards (self-)empowerment. And Claude Lefort’snotion of a ‘politics of human rights’ proceeds from this empowering potential:Human rights politics and democratic politics are two different ways of respondingto the same demand: to exploit the resources of liberty and creativity from whichan experience derives its power to bear the effects of the division; to resist thetemptation to exchange the present for the future, but rather to make the effort totrace in the present the prospects of success which become apparent through thedefense of acquired rights and the demand for new rights, and by doing so to learnto differentiate these from the mere satisfaction of interests. (cf. 1981: 83, mytranslation)1Certainly, this form of human rights politics is, if at all, still at the beginning of itspossibilities of development. What the future of human rights will look like, if a globalpolitical negotiation process about them will soon be initiated, all this is left to abecoming which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, “always eludes the majority” (1991:108). The urgent normative demand of human rights to make the current exclusion of alarge number of people marked as ‘strangers’, ‘refugees’, ‘stateless persons’ or simply‘others’ a historical fact, just like the exclusion of ‘savages’, workers and women in pastcenturies, can, in my opinion, not be denied. For the time being, the semantics of humanrights lends itself to this. As Deleuze puts it in his “Postscript on the Societies of Control”:“There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons.” (1992: 4)
translated from German by Florian Cord
1 The original reads: “Politique des droits de l’homme, politique démocratique, deux manières donc derépondre à la même exigence: exploiter les ressources de liberté et de créativité auxquelles puise uneexpérience qui accueille les effets de la division; résister à la tentation d’échanger le présent les lignes dechance qui s’indiquent avec la défense des droits acquis et la revendication des droits nouveaux, enapprenant à les distinguer de ce qui n’est que satisfaction de l’intérêt.” (Lefort 1981: 83)
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